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This working paper takes up three related themes. In section 1, I briefly describe the 
issues relevant to surveying American Jews and highlight the importance of authoritative 
national surveys; in section 2, I note that these surveys have not included much 
exploration of American Jewish divisions over Israeli and American Middle East policy. 
In section 3, I propose the rudiments of a sample design that would meet the traditional 
needs of the national survey as well as the political opinion poll. This design is based on a 
rotating national panel of respondents, somewhat like the U.S. government’s Current 
Population Survey. At the same time, data from earlier panels can be combined to 
increase sample size for the study of sociocultural issues that are less immediate in 
nature. Readers who are primarily interested in the issue of polling political opinion about 
Israeli and American Middle East policy may wish to read only sections 2 and 3. Those 
primarily interested in the proposal for a national survey based on a rotating panel may 
wish to read only section 3.
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1 I am grateful to Sergio Della Pergola, Yuval Elmelech, Bethamie Horowitz, Barry Kosmin, Tom Smith, 
and Efraim Yaar for comments on an earlier draft, or for discussion of the issues. Of course, I alone am 




1.   THE MAJOR SURVEYS OF AMERICAN JEWS 
 
America’s Jews number some 5 to 6 million souls, depending on whose surveys you 
believe and—ever more important these days—how you define who is a Jew. Put another 
way, about one American in fifty is Jewish. That ratio makes it hard to sample American 
Jews in a cost-efficient way. Randomly sampling Americans would involve screening out 
98% of the respondents. Problems shared with any large-scale national survey, of course, 
are also involved: it is harder to construct an adequate sample for a telephone survey in 
an era of cell phones and changing life styles. 
Of course, if the federal census counted individuals by religion as well as by 
ethnicity (as the Canadian census does), we would have much more information. 
However, the federal government long ago determined not to ask its citizens directly 
about their religious affiliations.
2 American Jewish organizations strongly supported this 
policy, arguing that the alternative would be a violation of the separation of church and 
state. The fact that Nazi forces used census records to identify Jews (and the United 
States government used census records to find Japanese-Americans) only solidified these 
positions. So if there is to be systematic information about this moderately large, very 
articulate, well-organized, and politically active American group, it will be collected by 
voluntary organizations, and almost certainly by Jewish organizations.  
Whoever does the survey must also confront the definitional issue: “Who is a 
Jew”? Given the large-scale intermarriage that has followed the general acculturation of 
Jews into American life, a great many young adults today are the children of intermarried 
parents. As a result, they have one parent who was born Jewish and another who was not. 
Sometimes that other parent has formally converted to the Jewish religion, or in some 
less formal way has become a “Jew by choice.” Often that other parent has done neither. 
In any case, among today’s young adult population who have a Jewish-born parent, a 
majority also had only one Jewish-born parent. Thus, a majority of young adults face 
their Jewishness as one among several ethnic and religious legacies connected with their 
families. There is nothing surprising about this situation in the context of American 
                                                 
2 Indeed, if Jews identify as such on the federal census ancestry question, their responses are reclassified to 




ethnic (and indeed American religious) history: it is a common story with other 
descendants of European immigrants. The point is rather that this situation has not faced 
so many descendants of the Jewish immigrants in the past.  
One result is that many people told the questioners in the last national survey that 
they were born to a Jewish-born parent, but that they themselves considered themselves 
Christian, or they reported that they had no religion. Nor was this response only a matter 
of religion; large numbers of these respondents made it clear that they did not consider 
themselves “secular Jews” in any sense either. In sum, people with mixed, complex 
backgrounds will identify in mixed, complex, and inconsistent ways. If we apply to their 
answers the rigid categories of 80 or even 50 years ago, we may as well close up shop: 
there is no reason to study continuity and change if we refuse to conceptualize the 
change. Of course, there have always been people at the fringes of the group; the point 
about the Jews today is that these people “at the fringes” have become very numerous, 
more typical of the group experience. Consider the following example. There has been 
some critical scrutiny of the 2000 survey on the grounds that it appears to have shown too 
large a fraction of Orthodox respondents among the group 18–29 years of age. However, 
in that survey among the same age group, the number of respondents who said they had 
at least one Jewish parent and considered themselves Christian was two-and-a-half times 
as great as the number who said they were Orthodox Jews. Incidentally, a quarter of those 
Christians also said that they considered themselves Jewish in some way. In other words, 
for every three individuals reporting themselves Orthodox, two reported themselves both 
Jewish and Christian.
3 Who, then, should be considered as a Jewish respondent? 
Surveys of American Jews have been of two main types. For many decades, 
particular Jewish communities tried to survey the Jews in their area—the Baltimore Jews, 
the New York Jews, the Seattle Jews. These surveys were typically contracted to survey 
                                                 
3 The discussion of the Orthodox has focused on their proportion among the subsample of respondents who 
were found to be “exclusively Jewish by religion.” See Leonard Saxe et al., Reconsidering the Size and 
Characteristics of the American Jewish Population: New Estimates of a Larger and More Diverse 
Community, Steinhardt Social Research Institute Report, January 2007 (version 1.3 March, 07); accessed 
April 27, 2007 at http://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/files/Rec_AJP_V1.3.pdf. Nevertheless, the issue of their 
overrepresentation is also visible when all respondents of the relevant age are studied. Specifically, among 
all NJPS respondents 18–29 years of age, 8.6% reported themselves Orthodox, 22.9% reported themselves 
Christian, and among those reporting a Christian affiliation many also reported themselves Jewish (5.8% of 
all respondents, 18–29 years of age). To be clear: I, too, think it is important to clarify whether or not the 




organizations, which typically turned to the membership lists of Jewish organizations 
(synagogues, community centers, donors to Jewish causes, and so on). Or they might rely 
on phonebooks, seeking out people with distinctive Jewish names and then adjusting the 
numbers by some factor to capture other groups (similarly, there were often counts of the 
decline in public school attendance on Yom Kippur). Obviously such methods come with 
a host of biases, biases that increase as Jewish affiliations decrease. To the local funding 
groups, the biases might matter less than to social scientists seeking to understand the 
group; still, even the local funders are concerned about missing so many who are 
unattached.  
The second type of survey is much more costly: random surveys of households, 
typically through random digit dialing. Since even in the areas of densest Jewish 
settlement—the New York metro area and some metro areas in Florida—the Jews are no 
more than 10–15% of all residents, the costs of a random sample involves many more 
screening calls than interview calls. Sometimes this method has been used in conjunction 
with the first, sometimes alone.  
 A rough guess would be that there have been thousands of surveys of local 
Jewish communities since the early twentieth century, and certainly dozens since the turn 
of the millennium alone. There has therefore been a temptation to build up a national 
profile of American Jews from the many local surveys. This temptation has only grown 
as the local surveys are now kept indefinitely in online databanks. But giving in to this 
temptation brings punishment, and I think resistance is in order. First, such local surveys 
are very uneven in quality, undertaken as they have been by communities with different 
levels of funding and expertise. This variation affects both the raw numbers for given 
areas and the subtlety and depth of the questions. Second, such surveys do not add up to a 
national survey. Taken at different times, local surveys are likely count some people 
twice or more because people move; Americans move often and American Jews move 
more often still. Third, areas outside the major communities are especially unlikely to 
receive systematically high quality coverage, and it is here that social patterns will be 
changing most rapidly and numbers increasing. For all the reasons a country does not 
allow its municipalities to run local censuses in place of a national census, American 




Nevertheless, local surveys there will always be because local communities need 
in-depth knowledge of local conditions, of neighborhood changes, and other particular 
circumstances. It would be an improvement if these local surveys were related to a 
national set of standards. Such standards could not be enforced, but they would surely 
help shame communities thinking of a cheap fix. 
National samples were first attempted in 1970, and then more perfectly in 1990 
and 2000. The spectacularly expensive screening process attempted to include a wide 
array of identities. Simplifying, anyone born to a Jewish-born parent and anyone who 
chose to join the Jewish people (whether by formal conversion to the Jewish religion or 
informally) was included. These samples are known respectively as the National Jewish 
Population Survey (NJPS) of 1990 and of 2000–1. They were supported by the umbrella 
group for local Jewish communities, now know as the United Jewish Communities 
(UJC). The 1990 survey included some 2,400 and the 2000 survey some 5,000 Jewish 
households. Efforts were made, especially in 1990, to link these studies to national 
surveys of American religion so that the great cost of the screening calls would be linked 
to another survey purpose rather than wasted.  
In both 1990 and 2000, the NJPS staff was employed directly by the Jewish 
funding group, although in both cases, consulting experts also included university 
professors. In 1990, the links to the university world were perhaps closer than later 
because the organization’s research director, Barry Kosmin, also worked at the City 
University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center at a clearinghouse for Jewish 
research. The sample design and survey process in 2000 was plagued with more internal 
dissension and criticism, and some technical problems also occurred during the survey 
process that added to the sense of crisis, disagreement, bad faith, and so on.
4 
A second national survey was undertaken in 2000, paralleling the NJPS at a much 
lower level of funding. The philanthropist Felix Posen became convinced that the NJPS 
was not illuminating Jews who were uninvolved with religion, but were, in one sense or 
another, secular Jews; he funded a supplemental effort, the American Jewish Identity 
Survey (AJIS). Thus, for the year 2000, there were two national surveys and two sets of 
                                                 
4 My own understanding of all this is entirely based on informal conversations over the years with 





reports. And now there are two public use samples as well: the AJIS dataset has recently 
joined the larger NJPS dataset at the North American Jewish Databank. Thus, we have 
the invaluable opportunity to compare information from two national surveys of this 
hard-to-reach population, taken almost simultaneously.  
There has been much scrutiny of the adequacy of the NJPS 2000 sample; a recent 
issue of the journal Contemporary Jewry was devoted entirely to methodological studies 
that appraised its use for research. Also, a major series of studies are underway at the 
Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) at Brandeis University, both to study the 
strengths and weaknesses of NJPS 2000 and to conduct an analysis of public-use surveys 
that routinely have a religion question (as an alternative way of establishing the number 
of American Jews).  
The meta-anlysis of national surveys that have a religion question may provide a 
more reliable and less expensive way to determine how to weight subsequent national 
samples of Jews—rather than relying on the weighting emerging from the huge survey 
effort to find the “Jewish needles in the American haystack.” It cannot, however, replace 
the many questions that have been asked in the NJPS, nor the many questions that have 
not been asked but should be asked.  
The bitter debates about NJPS 2000 may have led to some underappreciation of 
the dataset; but I think that value has been underestimated also because of the way UJC 
reports based on the dataset have been constructed. Understandably, the Jewish 
organizational world has been most interested in the traditionally-affiliated people—for 
example, those who report that they are Jews by religion and only Jews by religion. 
Adding in those who say they are Jews, but are not religious, may seem to cover the 
population that is open to Jewish communal services, education, and philanthropy. 
However, as I stressed earlier, many people with Jewish origins are not captured by this 
definition. Instead of devoting special reports to these groups, or at least indicating the 
numbers of Americans of (recent) Jewish ancestry (typically, having had a parent born 
Jewish), the UJC has excluded these people from analysis. Partly this procedure is a 
willful act of boosterism by not facing the extent of community fragmentation; partly it is 
an understandable response to particular survey needs. Whatever the reason, the result 




truncated, decontextualized view of the American Jewish reality. Nevertheless, to its 
undying credit, the UJC preserved the full dataset as a well-documented public use 
sample. The dataset can itself provide a corrective context to the UJC publications that 
were based upon it. 
 
2.   THE MISSING DIMENSION IN AUTHORITATIVE SURVEYS: VIEWS 
OF ISRAELI AND AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY 
 
Generally, American ethnics can think of an ancestral homeland as the land from which 
their immigrant forbearers came. The case of American Jews is different. While they may 
think of Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, or some other section of east-central Europe as the 
land from which their forbearers came, Jews typically feel little attachment to these 
places, only perhaps a curiosity to see the places. The tie of American Jews to Israel is 
another matter; if there is one foreign country that holds special interest for them as Jews, 
it is likely to be the Jewish state. As a symbol of Jewish rebirth, or of Hebrew culture, 
Israel commands much more involvement than the places of east-central Europe from 
which the Jewish immigrants actually came. Of course, most American Jews are not 
really closely involved with Israel; indeed, one of the many services of the NJPS has been 
to show how few Jews have actually been to Israel. However, the NJPS has not asked the 
hard questions about the diversity of American Jewish opinion on Israeli foreign policies 
or of American policies towards Israel and the Arabs. What do American Jews think 
about the position of the Israeli government concerning the Wall? Concerning giving up 
East Jerusalem? Concerning the rights of Israel to build settlements in the territories? 
Concerning the honesty and motivation of Israeli, Palestinian, and Syrian leaders? 
Indeed, how much do American Jews know of these matters? What sort of pressure, if 
any, do American Jews think the United States should apply to Israel? What are the 
dangers of American pressure on the Jewish state? What sort of support should America 
provide? The NJPS has tried to capture some political divisions and some features of the 
connection to Israel. Thus, it asks about the respondents political orientation—liberal or 
conservative, Democratic or Republican. And it asks about the respondent’s involvement 




closer than that to the hot political issues relative to the Middle East, despite the fact that 
these issues are among the most central concerns of many Jews.  
   There are at least two important reasons why this is so. First, the NJPS surveys 
have been undertaken once in ten years; and a decennial census-like survey is a poor 
vehicle for the exploration of current politics, especially about political issues that seem 
to shift dramatically over short time periods. Second, it is far from clear that the UJC 
funders of the NJPS are eager to gather evidence of discord and division over this 
profoundly touchy subject to American Jews.  
 
Inadequate Alternative Studies on Jewish Political Opinions about Israeli Policies 
For years, the American Jewish Committee has published the results of surveys of 
American Jewish political opinion. For a long time, the survey was based on Jewish 
names and on lists of members of organizations. In more recent years, the survey has 
been based on a private databank of users that a survey research firm maintains: people 
earlier identified as Jews through random sampling of households are asked if they could 
be called from time to time to answer questions. But the AJC report on this survey rarely 
includes any data allowing us to examine whether the population answering the questions 
is representative of the American Jewish population (however defined). The AJC report 
of 2001 was a partial exception. From the data of that year, it would appear that the 
population included is notably skewed to older and more affiliated Jews than were the 
NJPS 2000–1 respondents described in the UJC publications. 
Moreover, the AJC report, even if it were based on an authoritative sample, only 
tells us what percentage of Jews nationally agree with certain statements; the report is too 
crude, and the sample may be too small to allow us to learn which Jews hold certain 
opinions. Are supporters of the separation wall retired men in Florida or young female 
professionals in Seattle? The unaffiliated or the Orthodox?  
Both of these problems—adequacy of coverage and the failure to report survey 
results for American Jewish subpopulations—also typify the polls recently conducted for 
Americans for Peace Now and the Arab-American Institute; the representativeness of the 
samples are suspect and the samples are taken “for all Jews” with no effort to break down 




The Alternative Model: The Tel Aviv University Peace Index 
Observers often comment that far more political criticism and debate takes place in Israel 
than among American Jews. So too, far more and better polling of Jewish (and Arab) 
opinion about Israeli international policies occurs there than here. In particular, the 
Center for Peace Studies at the University of Tel Aviv has polled the Israeli population 
monthly for many years on the current political outlook. No matter what the immediate 
situation, the Center always includes certain basic questions. As a result, it is able to 
report monthly (in the Israeli newspaper of record, Haaretz) on a “peace index”: the 
degree of support for a series of basic propositions. The sample includes Israeli Jews and 
Israeli Arabs, and results are broken out for each. Results are also broken down for many 
subgroups of the population—for example, by political party, religious orientation, 
support for particular candidates for prime minister, and so on.  
The key feature of the Tel Aviv University poll is the authority it commands. The 
Center does not shrink from reporting that the “peace index” is declining or rising, or that 
it is rising in the Arab sector and declining in the Jewish, or the reverse. Presumably the 
Center staff members’ own support for the index would have fluctuated over the years. 
And indeed the range of political opinions of those engaged in the survey seems to be 
wide. The reporting is straightforward and the processes of data collection transparent. 
People of all political beliefs can assess its outcomes with some confidence in what they 
are reading.  
American Jewish political opinion needs to be captured in a comparably 
authoritative way so that the results are not dismissed as one more self-interested survey. 
Obviously, what is needed is not a slavish copy of the Tel Aviv University arrangements; 
and, in particular, there is no need for a monthly survey. But there is no reason why the 
Tel Aviv University survey could not serve as a model to be adapted.  
 
3.   PROPOSAL: A ROTATING PANEL TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A 
MODIFIED NJPS AND TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY PEACE INDEX 
 
 We can blend the strengths of the NJPS, the Tel Aviv University Peace Index, and the 




by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Of course, the CPS 
involves a much larger number of cases than proposed here, but the process of data 
collection could be similar. Specifically, the CPS adds new subsamples of the population 
to a panel of respondents each month and rotates older subsamples out of the sample 
after 18 months.
5 Such a survey design requires the surveyor to preserve the contact 
information so as to reach the same respondents several times over the 18-month period 
that they are in the panel. Contact information would be deleted from public-use files. 
Figure 1 shows an example of such a rotational plan, in which subsamples of 
households enter the sample at a given stage of the sampling process, each stage being 
three months apart in this example, and rotate out of the sample after 18 months. The 
entire panel available for polling at any given time includes six subsamples totaling 1,500 
respondents. Over the course of any given year (after the start-up year), four new 











                                                 
5 In the case of the CPS, there is another complexity that I ignore: households are rotated back in after a 
certain period, so that changes in their economic condition can be evaluated over time. There is nothing 
sacred about the 18-month lifespan for the subsample, but it may serve in the example presented here, and 
of course, the longer the lifespan of the subsample, the greater the difficulty of finding respondents for 
requestioning. 
6 The discussion here does not take account of sample member attrition during the course of the 18-month 
period of membership in the active panel. To the extent that such attrition is substantial (despite the best 
efforts to keep in touch with the respondents), either we will have to be content with somewhat fewer than 
1,500 cases at any one moment in time or we will have sample somewhat more than 1,000 people each year 
to ensure that 1,500 remain in the panel. In either case, of course, it will be necessary to consider issues of 
reweighting due to sample attrition during the 18 months. Obviously, if the attrition problem is severe, it 
will be important to consider other solutions, such as keeping the sample members in the active panel for a 
shorter period of time. On the other hand, surveyors have had experience with preserving sample members 
in active panels, and that experience should help with estimation of attrition and weigthing, as well as with 




Figure 1.  An Example of a Rotational Sample Design            
                               
stage  months                  Subsamples          
  e l a p s e d                              
  s i n c e                              
  i n c e p t i o n                              
                               
      a  b  c  d  e  f  g  h I j  k l  m  n o p r s 
stage 1  0   250  250  250  250 250 250              
stage 2  3                    250            
stage 3  6                      250           
stage  4  9                      250          
stage  5  12                       250         
stage  6  15                        250        
stage  7  18                         250       
stage  8  21                          250      
stage  9  24                            250     
stage  10  27                              250    
stage  11  30                                250   
stage  12  33                                  250  
stage  13  36                                    250
etc.               etc.                              etc.       
                               
          The model shown:                           
  At inception, 1,500 sample members a r e   s u r v e y e d .                
  New subsamples of 250 are added at each stage after the first (I.e.: every 3 months).              
  Thus 1000 new sample members are surveyed each year (subsamples g-j in the first year)           
  Each subsample (after the first 5) leave the active  panel  after  6  stages  (18  months).        
  The existing panel always includes six subsamples available for poll-type questions,            
  f o r   a   t o t a l   a v a i l a b l e   p a n e l   o f   1 5 0 0 .                      
  -------------                             
  NOTES:                             
  1) The period during which a subsample is in the active panel, available for polling: shown by shading:        
  2) Active panels at least 18 months apart in time include none of the same subsamples.  They can therefore be     
  combined as independent samples; three examples shown in rectangles highlighted in black:            
                               
 
There are several advantages to such a system of rotating subsamples in and out 
of a panel available across time.  
1.  The huge screening costs are spread out, so that after the first year the survey 




2.  As already explained, the great expense of sampling the American Jewish 
population involves the initial screening effort (reaching a small percentage 
of the population in random sampling). The advantage of “holding on” to a 
panel of representative respondents (albeit for a relatively short time) is that 
the panel’s political outlook can be sampled several times in the course of 
two years. The point is not so much to examine how the same individuals 
change their minds over time; it is simply to avoid the cost of screening in 
reaching a new sample of Jews. Also, of course, batteries of additional NJPS-
type questions on origins and attachments could be added from time to time. 
3.  While an adequate number will be available for sampling political opinion 
regularly, it is also true that over the course of several years, non-overlapping 
panels will be available for NJPS-type questions. Thus, these panels can be 
merged to appraise responses to NJPS-type questions, so long as the 
researcher is aware that the panels were sampled over the course of a few 
years. For example, the subsamples of January 2010–June 2011 might be 
merged with those of July 2011–December 2012. For many research 
purposes, the fact that the data were gathered at different moments in time 
will not matter: basic patterns of Orthodox philanthropy and travel to Israel, 
or “just Jewish” marriage and Jewish education are not likely to differ over 
such time periods.
7 This procedure is common today with the CPS samples of 
successive years to increase sample size. As a result, the sample collected at 
any one time need not be as large as the NJPS samples.  
4.  The Jewish population is extraordinarily concentrated: 58% of NJPS 
households were found in 10 metropolitan areas, another 33% are found in 61 
other metropolitan areas, and only 9% are found in the rest of the country—
where 323,000 Jewish households live among 34 million American 
households. It is true that even in the densest metro areas of Jewish 
settlement, reaching a Jewish household by random telephoning involves 
screening out a majority of the households reached—about 13 non-Jewish 
                                                 





households for every Jewish household reached. But to reach the last 9% of 
Jewish households among 34 million American households requires about 8 
times as many screening calls per household. Indeed, reaching these last 9% 
of Jewish households actually requires about a third of all screening calls.
8       
Two suggestions for reducing the costs of sampling this last 9% of 
households follow: a) These households, once sampled, might be rotated out 
of the sample more slowly than the other sample members. At any given 
time, the sample will then be representative of the entire American Jewish 
population. However, some members will have been in the panel longer than 
others; b) A decision could be made to under-sample the last 9% (and weight 
them up accordingly), so that, for example, they might represent only 4.5% of 
sample members. The ability to study this group as an independent element 
would be impaired, but less so the ability to discuss (for example) the quarter 
of all Jews living in the smallest Jewish communities. This primitive division 
of the target population into three categories based on the density of Jewish 
population in each is, of course, not meant to serve as a replacement for the 
far more detailed classifications that surveyors have used for the NJPS and 
AJIS in the past; I simply mean to call attention to the potential for avoiding 
some of the costs of reaching those Jews living in the areas of lowest Jewish 
density. 
5.  Another way of saving on costs is being explored by the Steinhardt Social 
Research Institute: the melding of organization lists and random sampling. 
This is likely, I suspect, to save more among the 58% most accessible than 
                                                 
8 In practice, finding the Jewish needle in this general American haystack is somewhat easier than appears 
at first sight—that is, finding respondents who meet NJPS sample criteria among all Americans. Sampling 
is likely to be done by households, and Jewish households are relatively smaller than those in the nation at 
large. Thus, the percentage of Jewish households among all households is greater than the percentage of 
Jews among all Americans. Also, the 2% figure for Jews in the American population is somewhat 
misleading because the strategy envisioned here, as in the NJPS, would be to sample Americans of recent 
Jewish origin, a notably larger number than that usually quoted for American Jews. Thus, weighted NJPS 
2000 data estimate about 3.75 million households represented by the NJPS respondent households. Nielson 
survey households for the country at large in 2000 were estimated at about 105 million. Jewish-origin 
households thus comprised, very roughly, about 3.5% of all American households—closer to 1 in 30 than 1 
in 50. Based on these two data sources, Jewish households in the top 10 Jewish metro areas comprised 
7.4% of all households, in the next 61 largest Jewish metro areas, Jewish households comprised 3.0% of all 
households, and elsewhere those last 9% of Jewish households comprised 0.9% of all households. It is 




among the 9% least so. I am cautiously skeptical about this procedure. The 
issue is not whether the technique can be introduced effectively under the 
leadership of the Steinhardt Institute in the survey of Boston Jewry. Rather, 
the issue is whether or not that demonstration project can serve as an easily 
replicable model when fewer and less-talented professionals oversee local 
efforts than took charge in Boston (or when the same staff is called upon to 
dilute its attention across membership lists of 50 or more Jewish communities 
nationwide). Still, perhaps the process of melding organization lists and 
random sampling could be introduced in the half-dozen largest communities 
with little or no decline in quality control. Such an innovation should result in 
reductions to screening costs.  
 
The Support and Organization of Such Sampling 
The easy part first: datasets and documentation should be warehoused as public-use 
samples, free to all users who log on to a website and establish their credentials as valid 
users of social statistics as in currently the case for the AJIS, NJPS, and other datasets at 
the North American Jewish Databank. The processes of the intellectual marketplace can 
be trusted to ensure that if skewed and biased publications appear, other researchers with 
opposing views will draw on the same datasets. This, of course, is exactly what happens 
today in contemporary studies based on census (or CPS) data. 
The hard part concerns organization and funding. It is difficult to appreciate how 
much of the effort to study American Jews has really been based outside the world of the 
American university, private research institutes, and federal agencies. Rather, community 
organizations whose main interest is not research but usable numbers have sponsored 
these surveys.
9 The tendency to avoid the study of attitudes to the Middle East conflict 
has fit well with this mode of funding. There is a strong case for basing the sort of survey 
work described here in a university or academic research center—rather than as an 
afterthought, however well funded, of the organized Jewish community that reaches out 
to survey contractors. A board of trustees that also included representatives of Jewish 
                                                 






organizations would be essential in helping to determine the balance of questions to be 
asked. But in some way, the long-term stability and the intellectual independence of such 
an effort must be secured.  
    
 